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in a setting where both exogenous and endogenous risks
are present. We explicitly model these risks to understand
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their implications to the precautionary principle. We ﬁnd
that, among other things, the increase of exogenous risk in
the presence of endogenous risk has a diﬀerent impact on
precaution than the increase in exogenous risk in the presence of only exogenous risk. While the latter is known to
decrease precaution, the former unambiguously increases
the precaution in the presence of stock eﬀect.
Recommendations for Resource Managers
• Two kinds of risk are prevalent. Endogenous risk is
created by human action. Exogenous risk is created by
nature.
• Endogenous risk can be minimized by taking several
actions. If there is only endogenous risk, resource managers should take precaution in extracting the resources.
• Managers should take precaution in extracting resources
if there are both endogenous and exogenous risk and
if there is stock eﬀect. Without stock eﬀect, results are
ambiguous.
• If there is only exogenous risk, managers can do nothing. Therefore, managers should allow for the depletion
of resources.
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Natural Resource Modeling

POUDEL AND PAUDEL

I N T RO D U C T I O N

We begin our discussion with a rather obvious example. At any moment, humanity may be fully or
partially destroyed by a falling meteor or some other disturbance in the universe. Such risks are in
general very small but can be considered constant over time, and are purely exogenous from the perspective of the humanity. Humanity also faces the risk of partial destruction to itself by its own hand,
for example, in a way explained by Malthus. In particular, in the absence of substantial technological
progress, the rising population and subsequent scarcity of resources may lead to a war or some other
form of calamity and hence move us toward our own destruction. Such risks are by deﬁnition endogenous from the perspective of the humankind. Almost all bioeconomic systems face both endogenous
and exogenous risks. In this paper, we provide a framework to analyze situations in which both such
risks are present. We use this framework to analyze a system that faces the risk of catastrophe once its
state crosses an uncertain threshold and determine whether the precautionary principle holds in such
a setting.
The literature on the impact of uncertain threshold, beyond which catastrophe sets in, is extensive.
Clarke and Reed (1994) found that exogenous risk decreases precaution, whereas endogenous, avoidable, risk increases it. In a series of papers, Tsur and Zemel (1998; 2004) noted that the ambiguity
regarding precaution was due to the reversibility of the catastrophic eﬀect. By focusing on irreversible
catastrophic events (Tsur & Zemel, 2004), they found that an increase in exogenous risk increases the
degree of precaution, in particular, if the uncertainty is only about the location of the threshold beyond
which irreversibility kicks in. On the other hand, Brozovic and Schlenker (2011) found nonmonotonicity in this setting, noting that an increase in risk may increase or decrease precaution. Polasky, De
Zeeuw, and Wagener (2011) integrated all these conditions into one general framework. In their work,
the planner faces the risk of a regime shift, leading to either a stock eﬀect (i.e., causing the stock to be
reduced to zero) or a system dynamics eﬀect (i.e., causing the system dynamics to shift to less desirable
dynamics). If the regime shift causes the stock to collapse, and if the probability of such regime shift
is exogenous, it will result in increased exploitation. However, if the regime shift is endogenous and if
it involves a change in system dynamics, then it will lead to decreased exploitation. Another important
result of the paper is that the endogenous probability of regime shift with a stock eﬀect (i.e., regime
shift involves reduction of stock to zero) implies that the result will be ambiguous –the case in which
many papers of the past have focused.
All these papers either deal with endogenous risk or exogenous risk, but not both risks at the same
time. However, as explained in the opening paragraph, systems generally face both types of risks. The
endogenous risk is controllable, whereas exogenous risk is not controllable. This paper explicitly uses
the mixture of these two types of risk to examine the precautionary principle.
Suppose the hazard rate of exogenous risk is given by 𝜆1 , a constant, and the hazard rate of endogenous risk is given by 𝜆(𝑠), where 𝑠 is the level of stock. The hazard rate denotes the risk of crossing
an unknown threshold level 𝑠∗ when the state variable is 𝑠. When state variable 𝑠 is monotonic, we can
induce the distribution for the arrival time of the catastrophe. Speciﬁc examples of such induction can
be found in literature and is also given below. Suppose 𝜏 is the random arrival time of catastrophe, and
𝜆𝜏 (𝑠) is the hazard rate of such arrival when stock level is 𝑠. The probability that catastrophe will occur
before the next Δ𝑡 time period when the stock is 𝑠 is given by:
The probability that both events will happen in the next Δ𝑡 time period + the probability that only
one of them happen in the next Δ𝑡 period
= (𝜆1 Δ𝑡)(𝜆𝜏 (𝑠)Δ𝑡) + (𝜆1 Δ𝑡)(𝜆𝜏 (𝑠)Δ𝑡) + (1 − 𝜆1 Δ𝑡)(𝜆1 (𝑠)Δ𝑡)
∼
− (𝜆1 +(𝜆𝜏 (𝑠))Δ𝑡).
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Similarly, the probability that no such catastrophe will occur in the next Δ𝑡 time period is
= Probability that none of them will happen in the next period
= (1 − 𝜆1 Δ𝑡)(1 − 𝜆𝜏 (𝑠)Δ𝑡)
∼
1 − (𝜆1 + 𝜆𝜏 (𝑠)Δ𝑡).
−
We term this representation of risk, in which both exogenous and endogenous hazard are explicitly
speciﬁed, composite risk.

2

MODEL

To better explore this idea, we assume we are looking at forest resources that may face the risk of ﬁre.
The exogenous risk of ﬁre requires no explanation, but the nature of endogenous risk probably does.
We assume that having more trees increases the forest resources, but also increases the risk of ﬁre. This
is a natural assumption in cases when falling leaves provide a natural path for ﬁre to spread. Once a
ﬁre occurs in the forest, the growth rate of the forest is impacted, because the carrying capacity of the
forest will be reduced. One primary reason for the reduction in carrying capacity is the loss of trees,
which will lead to an increase in erosion due to possible ﬂoods and other natural causes. This is also
a common example given in many papers on the risk of ﬁre, including Reed (1984). Yoder (2004)
includes an example of an increasing hazard rate for forest ﬁre as the forest ages.
In this paper, we use the framework employed by Polasky et al. (2011). Say a planner is solving
an inﬁnite horizon problem and has to decide the amount of harvest for each period. The parameters
of the models are 𝑟 (representing patience) and 𝑝 (>0, net price per unit of harvest, considered to be
ﬁxed during the planning horizon). The primitive function of the model also includes 𝜆(𝑠), a purely
endogenous hazard (i.e., the probability of a catastrophe occurring when stock level is 𝑠 + Δ𝑠, given
that it has not occurred yet). The model is represented as:
max ∞ −𝑟𝑡
𝑒 𝑝ℎ(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
{ℎ} ∫0
s.t.
𝑠(0) = 𝑠0 ; 𝑠(𝑡) ≥ 0, ℎ(𝑡) ≥ 0 ∀t,
where 𝐺(𝑠(𝑡)) = (𝑠(𝑡)) before the catastrophe, and 𝐺(𝑠(𝑡)) = (𝑠(𝑡)) after the catastrophe. In this paper,
catastrophe is deﬁned as the one-time permanent shift in system dynamics, with the growth rate changing from 𝐺1 to 𝐺2 . In the paper by Polasky et al. (2011), 𝐺𝑖 (𝑠) = 𝑔𝑠(1 − 𝐾𝑠 ), 𝑖 = 1, 2, (i.e., the source
𝑖
of the change in system dynamics is the change in carrying capacity).In our example, ﬁre destroys
trees, and the lack of trees results in the likelihood of more erosion. Erosion in the forest aﬀects the
land area covered by the forest, which implies a reduction in 𝐾𝑖 . This, in turn, results in a reduction in
the maximum sustainable yield.
There is only one catastrophe that can happen, post-catastrophe, there is no uncertainty in the model.
The Hamilton-Jacobi- Bellman equation for the post-catastrophe value function 𝑉2 is given by
}
{
′
0 = max 𝑝ℎ − 𝑟𝑉2 (𝑠) + 𝑉2 (𝑠)(𝐺2 (𝑠) − ℎ) .
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Given the linearity of the control function, the solution to this equation is given by the following
conditions:
(1) steady state s2 satisﬁes 𝐺2′ (𝑠2 ) = 𝑟
(2) the value function and its derivative at s2 are given by1
𝑠2
𝑟
⎧
𝑝𝐺2 (𝑠2 ) − ∫𝑠 𝐺 (𝜏) 𝑑𝜏
2
𝑒
⎪
𝑟
⎪
𝑝𝐺2 (𝑠2 )
𝑉2′ = ⎨
𝑟
⎪
(
)
⎪𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑚 (𝑠) 𝑝𝐺2 (𝑠2 ) + 1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑚 (𝑠) 𝑝ℎ𝑚
⎩
𝑟
𝑟

1
ℎ𝑚 −𝐺2 (𝑠)

where 𝑡𝑚 (𝑠) is a solution of the function 𝑡′𝑚 (𝑠) =

for 𝑠 < 𝑠2
for 𝑠 < 𝑠2
for 𝑠 < 𝑠2′

and 𝑉2′ (𝑠2 ) = 𝑝.

(3) The optimal harvest rate is given by
⎧ 0
⎪
ℎ = ⎨𝐺2 (𝑠2 )
⎪
⎩ ℎ𝑚

for 𝑠 < 𝑠2
for 𝑠 = 𝑠2 ,
for 𝑠 > 𝑠2

where ℎ𝑚 → ∞.2
The problem for the planner before the catastrophe is given by
{
max 𝐸

𝜏

∫0

}
𝑒−𝑟𝑡 𝑝ℎ(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝑒−𝑟𝜏 𝑉2 (𝑠(𝜏))

s.t.
𝑠̇ = 𝐺1 (𝑠(𝑡)) − ℎ(𝑡)
𝑠(0) = 𝑠0
𝑠(𝑡) ≥ 0, ℎ(𝑡) ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑡
Here 𝜏 is the time of arrival of catastrophe and is random by deﬁnition. As explained above, the
catastrophe can be the result of either endogenous or exogenous risks or both. We ﬁrst derive the
expression for the hazard function using the arrival time of the catastrophe when the risk is purely
endogenous, given that 𝜆(s) is known.
Let Ψ(𝑡) deﬁne the probability that 𝜏 ≤ t. Similarly, let F(s) and f(s) be the cumulative distribution
and probability distribution corresponding to the hazard rate 𝜆(s). It implies that 1-Ψ(𝑡) = prob(𝜏 ≥
1−𝐹 (𝑠 )
𝑡|𝜏 > 0) = prob(𝑠∗ ≥ 𝑠𝑡 |𝑠∗ ⟩𝑠0 ) = 1−𝐹 (𝑠 𝑡 ) . This means the probability distribution function 𝜓(𝑡) is
0
given by taking the derivative of the expression above:
𝑓 (𝑠 )𝑠
𝑓 (𝑠 )
𝜓(𝑡) = 1−𝐹 𝑡(𝑠 ) = 1−𝐹 (𝑠𝑡 ) (𝐺1 (𝑠) − ℎ). Hence the hazard rate associated with time is given by 𝜆𝜏 (𝑡) =
𝜓(𝑡)
1−Ψ(𝑡)

0

=

𝑓 (𝑠𝑡 )(𝐺1 (𝑠𝑡 )−ℎ)
1−𝐹 (𝑠𝑡 )

0

= 𝜆(𝑠𝑡 )(𝐺1 (𝑠𝑡 ) − ℎ). We use this expression for the distribution of random vari𝐹 (𝑠 )−𝐹 (𝑠 )

𝑡
0 3
. This expression allows us to write 𝜆𝜏
able 𝜏 to calculate the solution. Similarly, Ψ(𝑡) = 1−𝐹
(𝑠0 )
using 𝜆(s), which is assumed to be a primitive (given) function of the model.

POUDEL AND PAUDEL

5 of 10

Natural Resource Modeling

In the ﬁrst period, the planner solves the following problem:
]
[ 𝜏
max𝐸𝜏
𝑒−𝑟𝑡 𝑝ℎ(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝑒−𝑟𝜏 𝑉2 (𝑠𝑐 )
∫0
s.t.
𝑠̇ = 𝐺1 (𝑠(𝑡)) − ℎ(𝑡);
𝑠(0) = 𝑠0 , 𝑠(𝑡) ≥ 0, ℎ(𝑡) ≥ 0 ∀𝑡,
where 𝑠𝑐 is the level of the state variable immediately after the catastrophe happens. Using Bellman's
approach, we get the following expression for the value function
𝑤1 (𝑠; 𝑡) = max
ℎ

[

𝑡+Δ𝑡

∫𝑡

𝑒

−𝑟𝑡

𝑝ℎ(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + (1 − (𝜆1 + 𝜆𝜏 )Δ𝑡)𝑤1 (𝑠 + Δ𝑠, 𝑡 + Δ𝑡) + (𝜆1 + 𝜆𝜏 )Δ𝑡𝑒

−𝑟(𝑡+Δ𝑡)

𝑐

]

𝑉2 (𝑠 )

Using a standard dynamic theoretic approach, we now expand
𝑤1 (𝑠 + Δ𝑠; 𝑡 + Δ𝑡) around (𝑠; 𝑡); set 𝜆𝜏 = 𝜆 (s)(G1 (s)-h); and use the expression that
1
limΔ𝑡→0 Δ𝑡
∫𝑡𝑡+Δ𝑡 𝑒−𝑟𝑥 𝑝ℎ(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 = 𝑒−𝑟𝑡 𝑝ℎ(𝑡). This gives
0 = max 𝑒−𝑟𝑡 𝑝ℎ(𝑡) − (𝜆1 + 𝜆(𝐺1 − ℎ))𝑤1 + 𝑤1𝑡 + [𝜆1 + 𝜆(𝐺1 − ℎ)]𝑒−𝑟𝑡 𝑉2 + 𝑊1𝑠 (𝐺1 − ℎ)
ℎ

Here, we have suppressed the arguments of 𝑤1 , 𝜆, G1, w1s, w1t.
Using a familiar method of transformation, we convert this into a time autonomous problem. Let
ert w1 (s; t) = V1 (s). Using this format, we replace w1 (by e−rt V1 ); w1t (by − re −rt V1 ), w1s (by e −rt V1s )
and we get
0 = max
ℎ

{[
]
}
𝑝 − 𝑉1′ + 𝜆𝑉1 − 𝜆𝑉2 ℎ − 𝜆1 𝑉1 − 𝜆𝐺1 𝑉1 − 𝑟𝑉1 + 𝜆1 𝑉2 + 𝜆𝐺1 𝑉2 + 𝑉1′ 𝐺1 .

We now make a convenient statement:
Lemma 1. Suppose the following assumptions are made:
(a) Let Ω(s) = V1 (s) − V2 (s). Then Ω′ (𝑠) > 0, lim𝑠→∞ Ω(𝑠) → 0. (𝑏) lim𝑠→∞ 𝑉1′ >
𝑝 (𝑐) lim𝑠→∞ 𝜆(𝑠) → 0. (𝑑) lim𝑠→∞ 𝑉1′ = 0. Then there exists a unique root of 𝑓 (𝑠) =
𝑝 − 𝑉1′ + 𝜆𝑉1 + 𝜆𝑉2
Proof. Note that lim𝑠→0 𝑓 (𝑠) > 0. Since lim𝑠→∞ 𝜆(𝑠) → +∞, using (d), it is clear that lim𝑠→∞ 𝑓 (𝑠) >
′′
0. Continuity of f(s) then guarantees a root. Furthermore, since 𝑓 ′ (𝑠) = −𝑉1 + 𝜆′ (𝑠)(𝑉1 − 𝑉2 ) +
′
′
𝜆(𝑠)[𝑉1 (𝑠) − 𝑉2 (𝑠)] > 0, this function cannot have more than one real root.
The linear nature of our problem implies that the optimal h will be given by
⎧
⎪0
⎪
ℎ = ⎨ ℎ𝑚
⎪ 𝑠
⎪ℎ
⎩

𝑖𝑓 𝑝 − 𝑉1′ + 𝜆𝑉1 − 𝜆𝑉2 < 0
𝑖𝑓 𝑝 − 𝑉1′ + 𝜆𝑉1 − 𝜆𝑉2 > 0
𝑖𝑓 𝑝 − 𝑉1′ + 𝜆𝑉1 − 𝜆𝑉2 = 0 .
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Lemma 1 enables us to assume there exists a state 𝑠1 , such that when 𝑠 < 𝑠1 the policy is ℎ =
0, and when 𝑠 > 𝑠1 , ℎ = ℎ𝑚 , where ℎ𝑚 indicates the maximum allowable harvest rate. This assumption
implies that 𝑝 − 𝑉1′ (𝑠) + 𝜆(s)𝑉1 (𝑠) − 𝜆(s)𝑉2 (𝑠𝑐 ) < (>)0 when 𝑠 < (>)𝑠1 . The policy is a singular when
𝑠 = 𝑠1 .
Hence the value function, V1 (s), is given by
(
)
[
]
0 = 𝜆1 𝑉2 − 𝑉1 + 𝜆 𝐺1 𝑉2 − 𝐺1 𝑉1 + 𝑉1′ 𝐺1 − 𝑟𝑉1

for 𝑠 < 𝑠1 and

[
]
0 = 𝑝 − 𝑉1′ + 𝜆𝑉1 − 𝜆𝑉2 ℎ𝑚 + 𝜆1 (𝑉2 − 𝑉1 ) + 𝜆(G1 V2 − G1 V1 ) + 𝑉1′ 𝐺1 − 𝑟𝑉1

(1)

for 𝑠 > 𝑠1

(2)

Assuming that the value function is continuously diﬀerentiable, we can take
(1) and (2) as two independent equations satisfying both (1) and (2) at 𝑠 = 𝑠1 , and solve for 𝑉1 (𝑠1 )
and 𝑉1′ (𝑠1 ). The solutions are
𝑉1 (𝑠1 ) =

𝜆1 𝑉2 − 𝜆𝐺1 𝑉2 + 𝑝𝐺1 − 𝑉2 𝐺1
𝑟 + 𝜆1

𝑉1′ (𝑠1 ) =

for 𝑠 > 𝑠1

and

(𝑟 + 𝜆1 + 𝜆𝐺1 )𝑉1 − (𝜆1 + 𝜆𝐺1 )𝑉2
𝐺1

(3)

(4)

If we were to know 𝑠1 , then (3) and (4) would give an expression for the value function at 𝑠 =
𝑠1 . Moreover, diﬀerentiating (1) and (2) with respect to 𝑠, we get,
When 𝑠 < 𝑠1,
′′

𝐺1 (𝑠)𝑉1 (𝑠) = 𝑟𝑉1′ (𝑠) − 𝑉1′ 𝐺1′ − 𝜆[𝐺1 𝑉2′ + 𝐺1′ 𝑉2 − 𝐺1 𝑉1′ − 𝐺1′ 𝑉1 − 𝜆′ [𝐺1 𝑉2 − 𝐺1 𝑉1 ]
(
)
− 𝜆1 𝑉2′ − 𝑉1′

(5)

When 𝑠 > 𝑠1 ,
[
]
′′
[𝐺1 (𝑠) − ℎ𝑚 ]𝑉1 (𝑠) = − 𝜆′ 𝑉1 + 𝜆𝑉1′ − 𝜆′ 𝑉2 − 𝜆𝑉2′ ℎ𝑚 + 𝑟𝑉1′ (𝑠) − 𝑉1′ 𝐺1′
[
]
[
]
[
]
− 𝜆 𝐺1 𝑉2′ + 𝐺1′ 𝑉2 − 𝐺1 𝑉1′ − 𝐺1′ 𝑉1 − 𝜆′ 𝐺1 𝑉2 − 𝐺1 𝑉1 − 𝜆1 𝑉2′ − 𝑉1′ (6)

(
)
Let 1 (𝑠) = 𝜆𝑉1′ + 𝜆′ 𝑉1 − 𝜆𝑉2′ − 𝜆′ 𝑉2
[
]
[
]
(
)
and 2 (𝑠) = 𝑟𝑉1′ (𝑠) − 𝑉1′ 𝐺1′ − 𝜆 𝐺1 𝑉2′ + 𝐺1′ 𝑉2 − 𝐺1 𝑉1′ + 𝐺1′ 𝑉1 − 𝜆′ 𝐺1 𝑉2 − 𝐺1 𝑉1 − 𝜆1 𝑉2′ − 𝑉1′ .
Lemma 2. If𝜆′ (𝑠) > 0, 1 (𝑠) > 0∀𝑠, then the necessary condition for 1 (𝑠) ≤ 0 is 𝜆′ (𝑠) < 0.
𝑑
𝑑
[𝜆(𝑉1 − 𝑉2 )] = 𝑑𝑠
[𝜆Ω] = 𝜆Ω′ + 𝜆′ Ω. We know
Proof. It should be obvious, noting that 1 (𝑠) = 𝑑𝑠
𝜆, Ω, and Ω′ are strictly positive. Hence unless, 𝜆′ < 0, 1 (𝑠) > 0. Note, however, that 𝜆′ < 0 is necessary but not suﬃcient condition for 1 (𝑠) ≤ 0. By observing (5) and (6), it is clear that the concavity
of V1 would imply (i) The right hand side of (5) is negative at 𝑠 ≤ 𝑠1, and (ii) the right hand side of (6)
is positive at 𝑠 ≥ 𝑠1. 4 Furthermore, notice that from Lemma 2,
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𝑉 ′ −𝑉 ′

1 (𝑠) > 0; because 𝜆′ (𝑠) > 0 [by assumption], which trivially implies that 𝜆′ (𝑠) > −𝜆 𝑉1 −𝑉2 . Taking
′′

2 (𝑠)
,
1 𝐺1 (𝑠)

the limit from the left, we get lim𝑠→𝑠− 𝑉1 = lim𝑠→𝑠−
′′

lim𝑠→𝑠+ 𝑉1 = lim𝑠→𝑠+
1
1
∞, we get

2 (𝑠)−1 (𝑠)ℎ𝑚
.
𝐺1 ℎ𝑚

1

1

2

and taking limit from the right, we get

Assuming that the limit exists at 𝑠 = 𝑠1 , and allowing for ℎ𝑚 →

𝐺1 (𝑠1 ) =

2 (𝑠1 )
.
1 (𝑠1 )

(7)

This expression is valid, since by assumption 1 (𝑠1 ) > 0. Now replacing 2 and 1 , by their deﬁnition, we get
𝐺1 =

[
]
[
]
(
)
𝑟𝑉1′ (𝑠) − 𝑉1′ 𝐺1′ − 𝜆 𝐺1 𝑉2′ + 𝐺1′ 𝑉2 − 𝐺1 𝑉1′ + 𝐺1′ 𝑉1 − 𝜆′ 𝐺1 𝑉2 − 𝐺1 𝑉1 − 𝜆1 𝑉2′ − 𝑉1′
𝜆𝑉1′ + 𝜆′ 𝑉1 − 𝜆𝑉2′ − 𝜆′ 𝑉2

.
(8)

Upon further simpliﬁcation, we get
[𝐺1′ − 𝑟 − 𝜆1 ]𝑉1′ = 𝜆𝐺1′ 𝑉1 − 𝜆𝐺1′ 𝑉2 − 𝜆1 𝑉2′ .

(9)

From (8), we know that in the limiting case when 𝜆(𝑠) and 𝜆1 are identically zero, 𝐺1′ (𝑠1 ) = 𝑟, which
is the standard solution in the absence of risk.
We also note that all functions in (9) are known as the values of 𝑉1 , 𝑉2 , 𝑉1′ , and 𝑉2′ have all been
calculated previously.
Equation (9) provides a framework to compare the steady state solutions under endogenous risk.
First, notice that (9) can be written as
(
)
𝑟𝑉1′ + 𝜆1 𝑉1′ − 𝑉2′
𝐺1′ =
(
) .
𝑉1′ − 𝜆 𝑉1 − 𝑉2

(10)

Our discussion of the precautionary principle for endogenous risk rests crucially on (10).
(i) First, it is clear that in the absence of exogenous risk, the impact of endogenous risk is to increase
the value of 𝐺1′ , and hence decrease the level of steady state that the planner would be in if there
were no such risk. Since 𝑉1 − 𝑉2 > 0, (since the dynamics is assumed to be changing for worse, by
deﬁnition 𝑉2 should be less than 𝑉1 ), it is clear that the impact of endogenous risk (or its increase) is
unambiguously in favor of precaution. (To avoid the negative value of the steady state, we assume
the denominator is not negative). In the forest management problem, it is implied that the risk of
catastrophic wildﬁre causes decision makers to maintain a less steady state stock of forest, if they
believe more trees will increase the hazard of wildﬁre. Precaution (or the propensity to stay farther
away from the unknown threshold point triggering catastrophe) is an unambiguous result.
(ii) When the system faces the risk of extinction, i.e., 𝑉2 = 𝑉2′ = 0, a situation much studied in the literature, mainly under the topic of irreversible catastrophe and also called stock eﬀect, (10) becomes

8 of 10

POUDEL AND PAUDEL

Natural Resource Modeling

𝐺1′ =

𝑟𝑉1′ +𝜆1 𝑉1′
𝑉1′ −𝜆𝑉1

. By dividing the numerator and denominator of the right hand side by 𝑉1′ , this can

also be written as
𝐺1′ =

𝑟 + 𝜆1
( ).
𝑉
1 − 𝜆 𝑉 1′

(11)

1

Since this is the condition that needs to be satisﬁed in the steady state, intuitively, it is easy to see that
the role of exogenous risk, in the presence of endogenous risk, when there is stock eﬀect, is to increase
precaution, as it increases the numerator. To see this, we note that the relationship between 𝑉1 and
𝑉
𝑉1′ at 𝑠 = 𝑠1 , when V2 = 0 is given by 𝑉 1′ = 𝜆1 (1 + 𝑉𝑝′ ), since at singular solution 𝑝 − 𝑉1′ + 𝜆𝑉1 = 0
when 𝑉2 = 0, 𝑉1′ > 𝑝 > 0. Hence

𝑉1
𝑉1′

1

1

> 0. In that case, (11) can be rewritten as 𝐺1′ =

𝑟+𝜆1
,
(𝑝∕𝑚1 (𝑠1 ))

where

𝑚1 (𝑠1 ) is the shadow price evaluated at steady state. If the market price reﬂects the shadow price, i.e.,
in case of no market failure, we get 𝐺1′ = 𝑟 + 𝜆1 , the result often found in the literature. This is an
unambiguous result.
This is an important distinction from (i), and from previous studies in the literature in general. This
implies that when there are both endogenous and exogenous risks, the risk of catastrophe won't lead
people to act recklessly, and people actually react by increasing their precaution, especially if the market
is pricing the resources precisely. Ambiguity is possible if resources are not priced accurately. The result
in (i) was unconditional, the result here is not.
(iii) When there is no stock eﬀect, the impact of exogenous risk, in the presence of endogenous risk, is
ambiguous if the sign of 𝑉1′ − 𝑉2′ is not constant. It crucially depends on which state the system
will be in after the change in
the dynamic system. Suppose that post-catastrophe, the system moves to the state 𝑠 < 𝑠2 . If after
the catastrophe, the value function is believed to grow fast, whereas at the current state, the growth is
comparatively stagnant, a not implausible scenario, the planner may not exercise precaution, especially
since (a) she believes that the risk is exogenous and (b) though the transition is to a less desirable state,
the growth rate in the less desirable state is higher than the growth rate she is in. If the planner believes
that the risk is purely exogenous and that she could possibly do nothing to mitigate it, she is likely
to be unworried, but if she knows further that the catastrophe will lead to a growth friendly state, she
will be more upbeat and throw the caution away. However, for that to happen, the post-transformation
marginal value function must be higher than pre catastrophe marginal value function.
(iv) The impact of exogenous risk in the absence of endogenous risk can't be analyzed by using (10),
since derivation of (10) relies on (7). In the absence of endogenous risk, 1 (𝑠) = 𝜆𝑉1′ + 𝜆′ 𝑉1 −
𝜆𝑉2′ + 𝜆′ 𝑉2 = 0, and this implies that (7) is not a valid expression. However, the concavity of
value function implies that the right hand side of equation (5), namely 2 (𝑠), must be negative
when 𝑠 < 𝑠1 , and positive when 𝑠 > 𝑠1 . Therefore at the steady state, 𝑠 = 𝑠1 , 1 (𝑠) = 0, which,
using 𝜆 = 𝜆′ = 0, implies that, at 𝐺1′ =

𝑟𝑉1′ (𝑠)+𝜆1 (𝑉1′ −𝑉2′ )
𝑉1

= 𝑟 + 𝜆1 (1 −

𝑉2′
𝑉1′

)

This gives the increase in exogenous risk implies an increase in discount rate type result, found
in Reed (1984), Yaari (1965) and many other papers in the literature. However, the expression above
implies that the results of Yaari (1965) are special case of our model, and is valid when 𝑉2′ = 0 (i.e.,
when the catastrophe implies 𝑉2 = 0 in all states). This is the opposite of the precautionary principle,

POUDEL AND PAUDEL

Natural Resource Modeling

9 of 10

but is often justiﬁed by claiming that people respond to exogenous risk by overexploiting resources
since there is nothing they can do to prevent the catastrophe. It is also clear that in general, the value
inside the parenthesis depends on the speciﬁcation of both 𝑉1 and 𝑉2.

3

CONC LU SI ON S

Our results show the importance of correctly framing the risk analysis model. Our formulation also
enables us to analyze the subtleties of risk. Notice that in the absence of analysis in such detail it is
possible to arrive at an ambiguous result, without understanding the source of the ambiguity.
Our results also extend and clarify previous results. Polasky et al. (2011), whose framework we
have used in the analysis, ﬁnd support for precaution only in the case of the system dynamics eﬀect for
endogenous probability in regime shift change. In our setting, the support for precaution also extends
to the case of the stock eﬀect when the market is correctly pricing the resources.
To summarize, our work provides a framework for analyzing the optimal decision making of a
planner facing diﬀerent sources of threats to the system. We also provide a new, composite formulation
for such risk. The consequences of such formulations are important. First, we clariﬁed the conditions
under which some of the results found in the literature are valid, thus providing a general setting
for the analysis of risk. Second, our formulation provides a clear portrayal of aggregate risk and
allows analysts to focus on diﬀerent (endogenous and exogenous) parts of such risks. Third, our
formulation also allows diﬀerent uncertainty assumptions about the hazard rate. Fourth, our work
provides clear evidence that the response to exogenous risk crucially depends on the presence or
absence of endogenous risk in the system.
In terms of application, we contribute to the age-old problem of how an increase in exogenous (as
well as endogenous) risk aﬀects the behavior of individuals. Increase in exogenous risk in the absence
of endogenous risk is well understood in literature as Yaari (1965) showed long ago, and as has been
agreed upon by economists since then. However, we also provide the characterization for the situation
in which exogenous risk increases in the presence of endogenous risk. In such a situation, if the risk
of the stock collapse increases, people respond by increasing precaution. Suppose, an Armageddon
is about to hit the earth. This is purely exogenous risk, and people respond to it by overconsuming
and merry making. On the other hand, suppose people recognize that there are two diﬀerent ways in
which atmosphere may collapse: one is by increased solar ultraviolet rays and another is by increased
consumption that leads to greenhouse gas release. If solar ultraviolet rays increase, people respond by
decreasing consumption so as to reduce greenhouse gases, even though the only risk that increased
was exogenous one. This is one of the main insights from this paper.
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END NOTES
1 Note

that when 𝑠 < 𝑠2 ; 𝑉2′ (𝑠)𝐺2 (𝑠) − 𝑟𝑉2 (𝑠) = 0, which is an ordinary diﬀerential equation for 𝑉2 (𝑠). Dividing both
− ∫0𝑠

sides by 𝐺2 (𝑠) and multiplying by 𝑒

𝑟
𝑑𝑥
𝐺2 (𝑥)

, we get 𝑒

− ∫0𝑠

𝑟
𝑑𝑥
𝐺2 (𝑥)

𝑉2′ (s) - 𝑒

− ∫0𝑠

𝑟
𝑑𝑥
𝐺2 (𝑥)

𝑟
𝐺2 (𝑠)

𝑉2 (𝑠) = 0. Since the left hand
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−∫𝑠

𝑟

𝑑𝑥

𝑑
side is 𝑑𝑠
[𝑉2 (𝑠) 𝑒 0 𝐺2 (𝑥) ], taking integration of both sides from 0 to s, and noting that 𝑉2 = 0; and 𝑉2 (𝑠2 ) = , which
is the net present value of payoﬀ 𝑝𝐺2 𝑆2 for perpetuity, we get the solution.
2 This

is a standard result in the literature. One way to see this is as follows. Throughout this analysis, we assume the
Benveniste-Scheinkman condition (Benveniste & Scheinkman, 1979) for the envelope theorem holds. Note that for 𝑠 <
′′
𝑟𝑉 (𝑠)
𝑠2 ; 0 = −𝑟𝑉2 + 𝑉2′ (𝑠)𝐺2 (𝑠), and taking derivative with respect to 𝑠, we get, 𝑉2 (𝑠) = (𝑟 − 𝐺2′ (𝑠)) (𝐺 2(𝑠))2 . The concavity
2

of value function implies 𝑟 − 𝐺2′ (𝑠) ≤ 0. Repeating same for s > we get 𝑟 − 𝐺2′ (𝑠) ≥ 0, since
′′

ℎ𝑚 → ∞. The continuity of 𝑉2 (𝑠) then implies that =

𝐺2′ (𝑠2 ).

𝑟𝑉2 (𝑠)−𝑝ℎ𝑚
(𝐺2 (𝑠)−ℎ𝑚 )2

is negative for

3

We haven't proven the fact that the state variable 𝑠𝑡 would be monotonic over time. The proof is straightforward and
relies on the arguments similar to those made in papers such as in Long (1978), Tsur and Zemel (1994), and Spraker
and Biles (1996). Our calculation here follows a method similar to Tsur and Zemel (1994).

4

We assume 𝑉1 is concave here.
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